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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  This paper examines the genealogy of the acquis communautaire of the European Union 
(EU).  Acquis communautaire is a phrase that defies easy translation into English.  At times it 
has been rendered simply as “Community patrimony.”
1  Academics have tended to leave it 
untranslated, but to describe it in greater detail.  For example, Philippe Schmitter defined acquis 
communautaire as “the sum total of obligations that have accumulated since the founding of the 
[European Coal and Steel Community] and are embedded in innumerable treaties and 
protocols.”
2  Roger Goebel is perhaps best at capturing the “settled” quality of the acquis, if one 
may borrow that term from jurisprudence.  He states that the “acquis communautaire essentially 
conveys the idea that the institutional structure, scope, policies and rules of the Community (now 
Union) are to be treated as ‘given’ (‘acquis’), not to be called into question or substantially 
modified by new states at the time they enter.”
3 
  To date, investigations into the genesis of the acquis communautaire have proved 
inconclusive.  The term acquis communautaire rose out of obscurity sometime in the 1960s to 
become the project of European integration’s “holiest cow of all.”
4  Although a variety of 
                                                 
 
1  European Communities, Glossary the Reform of the European Union in 150 definitions 
(Brussels: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1997). 
 
2  Philippe Schmitter, “Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New 
Concepts,” in Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck, et al., 
eds., Governance in the European Union (London: Sage, 1996), p. 162. 
 
3  Roger J. Goebel, “The European Union Grows: The Constitutional Impact of the 
Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden,” Fordham International Law Journal 18 (April 
1995), pp. 1141-43. 
 
4  Joseph H. H. Weiler, “The Reformation of European Constitutionalism,” Journal of 
Common Market Studies 35, no. 1 (1997), p. 98.  
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historians, lawyers and political scientists have explored the matter, they have all restricted their 
scope of their studies to the postwar era and none have definitely established its origins.
5  
Limiting the examination to the postwar years, however, lifts the acquis communautaire out of 
its larger historical context, silencing the deeper historical legacy that accounts for its very 
existence. 
  This paper argues that a full understanding of the significance of the acquis 
communautaire for European and international politics requires an analysis that extends beyond 
the spatial and chronological confines of postwar Europe.  It posits that the provenance of the 
acquis communautaire can be traced back to the concept of “standard of civilization,” which the 
European colonial powers crafted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to 
justify colonial rule.  The genealogy of the acquis communautaire reveals that the concept is 
embedded within a discourse that necessitates the construction of a less-than-civilized, non-
European “other.”  By definition it places EU members above other nations and precludes the 
acceptance of difference as equal.  Moreover, the acquis communautaire as currently constituted 
                                                 
 
5  Studies of the origins of the acquis communautaire by legal scholars include: Goebel; 
Christine Delcourt, “The Acquis Communautaire: Has the Concept had its Day?” Common 
Market Law Review 38, no. 4 (August 2001), pp. 829-70; Carlo Curti Gialdino, “Some 
Reflections on the Acquis Communautaire,” Common Market Law Review 32 (1995), pp. 1089-
1121; and Pierre Pescatore, “Aspects judiciaires de l’acquis communautaire,” Revue 
Trimestrielle de Droit Européen 21 (1981), pp. 617-57.  Some political scientists have also 
looked at this question, for example, Christopher Preston, “Obstacles to EU Enlargement:  The 
Classical Community Method and the Prospects for a Wider Europe,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 33, no. 3 (1995), pp. 451-63; and Antje Wiener, “The Embedded Acquis 
Communautaire: Transmission Belt and Prism of New Governance,” European Law Journal 4 
(1998).  Knud Erik J￿rgensen has conducted a constructivist analysis of the acquis 
communautaire, focusing on the failed enlargement discussions of the early 1960s (“The Social 
Construction of the Acquis Communautaire:  A Cornerstone of the European Edifice,” European 
neIntegration Online Papers 3, no. 5, posted 29 April 1999, <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-
005a.htm>).  
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and employed invests the European Union as the exclusive author of the values and practices of 
“civilization,” and the sole judge determining which nations belong to the club of the “civilized.”  
Using the acquis communautaire as the cornerstone of European integration is therefore 
particularly problematic for the conduct of EU foreign policy.  The construct, which is inherently 
hierarchical and hegemonic, risks encouraging a revival of European chauvinism. 
  This paper has three parts.  Part one discusses the conceptualization of the “standard of 
civilization.”  It shows that the “standard of civilization” took three forms in European politics 
before the Second World War:  a legal doctrine, a device to sort regimes and peoples, and a 
hegemonic ideal.  Part two investigates the demise of the “standard of civilization” and the 
impact of this collapse on European identity during the mid-twentieth century.  It suggests that 
the acquis communautaire represents a reconfigured retrieval the “standard of civilization.”  Part 
three delves into the usage of the acquis communautaire in the postwar project of European 
integration. 
 
2.  THE “STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION” 
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European conceptualizations of “international 
society” comprised only Christian rulers and peoples.
6  Others fell outside of the realm of 
society.  This began to change towards the end of the eighteenth century, writes Hedley Bull: 
“As religious influences on international politics gave place to secular ones, the belief that 
international society was distinctively Christian went into decline, but was replaced by the belief 
                                                 
 
6  Hedley Bull, “Foreword,” in: Gerrit Gong, The Standard of “Civilization” in 
International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. vii.  
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that it was a society confined to states of European culture and civilization.”
7  The decline of the 
power of religious authority, increased contact with peoples of non-European descent, and the 
ascendancy of positivist legal conceptions led European nations to re-define “the conditions 
under which they would or would not admit non-European political communities to membership 
of the international society they formed among themselves.  Thus arose the idea that independent 
political communities which aspired to membership of international society had to meet a 
standard of ‘civilization’.”
8 
By the turn of the twentieth century, the “law of Christian nations” had been “slightly 
altered and largely redefined as the ‘law of “civilized” nations’.”
9  One can define a “law” or 
“standard of civilization” as “an expression of the assumptions, tacit and explicit, used to 
distinguish those that belong to a particular society from those that do not.”  By definition, 
“those who fulfill the requirements of a particular society’s standard of civilization are brought 
inside its circle of ‘civilized’ members, while those who do not so conform are left outside as 
‘not civilized’ or possibly ‘uncivilized’.”  Until World War II, this “standard of civilization” 
played three roles in international affairs: a legal framework, a sorting mechanism to judge 
peoples and states, and a hegemonic ideal.  Each of these roles is addressed below.
10 
 
2.1  The “Standard of Civilization” as a Legal Framework 
                                                 
 
7  Ibid. 
 
8  Ibid. 
 
9  Gong, p. 5. 
 
10  Ibid., p. 3.  
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The ‘standard of civilization’ was first and foremost a legal principle.  “By 1905, at the 
latest,” writes Gerrit Gong, “a standard of ‘civilization’ had emerged as an explicit legal 
principle and an integral part of the doctrines of international law prevailing at the time.”
11  The 
principle divided the world into three categories: “civilized,” “semi-civilized” and “barbaric.”  
According the Hedley Bull, the “standard” emerged as a response to the “need for reciprocity in 
dealings between European and non-European peoples.”
12  To enter what nineteenth century 
publicists called the “Family of Nations,” a state needed to show that it could honor the 
obligations and responsibilities attributed to a “civilized” nation as defined by Europeans.  This 
left the Ottoman Empire, Japan, China, Siam and other ‘eastern’ states on the fringes of 
“civilized” society. 
Until the end of the nineteenth century, the “standard” by which the Ottomans and others 
were judged remained unsaid.  Increased contact with non-European peoples, however, led 
European powers to make previously implicit assumptions explicit requirements.  “In the course 
of intense interaction with countries unfamiliar with the European international society’s 
customary practices and unspoken assumptions, these standards needed to be explicitly 
articulated.”
13  To codify the “standard of civilization,” international legal scholars developed a 
set of five requirements: 
1. a “civilized” state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity, and 
property; freedom of travel, commerce, and religion, especially that of 
foreign nationals; 
                                                 
 
11  Ibid., p. 14. 
 
12  Bull, p. viii. 
 
13  Gong, p. 38.  
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2. a “civilized” state exists as an organized political bureaucracy with 
some efficiency in running the state machinery, and with some capacity to 
organize for self-defense; 
 
3. a “civilized” state adheres to generally accepted international law, 
including the laws of war; it also maintains a domestic system of courts, 
codes, and published laws which guarantee legal justice for all within its 
jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike;   
 
4. a “civilized” state fulfills the obligations of the international system by 
maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic interchange 
and communication. 
 
5. a “civilized” state by and large conforms to the accepted norms and 
practices of the “civilized” international society, e.g. suttee, polygamy, 
and slavery were considered “uncivilized,” and therefore unacceptable.
14 
 
The impact of this codification on the Ottoman Empire is particularly interesting.  The 
1856 Treaty of Paris gave the Sublime Porte a kind of provisional admittance into European 
society.  Yet, in the words of one early twentieth century scholar of international law “her 
position as a member of the Family of Nations was anomalous, because her civilization fell short 
of that of Western states.”
15  When the Treaty of Paris was signed, the “standard of civilization” 
remained a largely subjective, uncodified set of assumptions.  There were certainly a number of 
stipulations that the Ottomans were required to meet in order to join the “concert européen” in 
1856, but these were not articulated in terms of a “standard of civilization.”  By the 1907 Second 
Hague Conference, however, the “standard” was clear.  At the Hague Conference, the Ottomans 
were placed among the “second-class” powers largely because of the “capitulations.”  During the 
                                                 
 
14  Ibid, pp. 14-15. 
 
15  L. Oppenheim, International Law, Ronald Roxburgh, ed., 3rd edition (London: 
Longmans, Green and Co., 1920), p. 34.  
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twelfth century, the Sultan extended extra-territorial jurisdiction to European “infidels.”  These 
legal rights—known as the “capitulations”—were originally granted as a means of allowing 
European nationals to be judged by their own civilizational standards rather than by rules of the 
Sublime Porte.  Over the centuries, however, the capitulations “became a symbol in European 
eyes of Ottoman inability to uphold ‘civilized’ standards.”
16  Europeans, in other words, 
interpreted the capitulations as evidence that the Ottoman legal system was not up to the 
“standard of civilization” now written into international law. 
A few non-European nations did manage to achieve “civilized” status—most notably 
Japan and the United States.  Yet the power to grant “civilized” status remained in European 
hands. And this brings us to the second function of the “standard of civilization,” its sorting role. 
 
2.2  The “Standard of Civilization” as a Sorting Tool 
  Although the “standard of civilization” emerged as a legal doctrine, it went well beyond 
the realm of international law.  It also “reflected Europe’s need to explain and justify its 
overlordship of non-European countries in other than merely military terms.”
17  By the late 
nineteenth century, colonial expansion was frequently justified along moral and civilizational 
lines.  Placing colonized or non-European peoples into the “uncivilized” category did not mean 
that non-Europeans were deemed incapable of achieving “civilization.”  Indeed, colonial powers 
saw colonialism as means of spreading “civilization” to the backward, unenlightened regions of 
the globe. 
                                                 
 
16  Gong, p. 107. 
 
17  Ibid., p. 42.  
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In Britain this became the “White Man’s Burden,” typified by Cecil Rhodes’ famous call 
for “equal rights for every civilized man.”  In France, political leaders and colonial 
administrators spoke of their “mission civilisatrice.”  The French traced their “civilizing 
mission” back to 1789.  The Revolution produced a widely held ethos within France that “la 
grande nation had an obligation to carry the revolutionary ideals beyond France’s borders.”  
Revolutionary ideology “helped transform the Enlightenment belief that barbarians could be 
civilized into the imperial doctrine that France should be civilizing fettered and depraved peoples 
everywhere.”
18  The ultimate goal of the French “civilizing mission” was the transformation of 
“uncivilized” peoples into liberated French citizens in accordance with the “Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen.” 
The distinction between the rights of “Man” and the rights of the “Citizen” is crucial for 
in the French colonial vision.  In the French colonial empire, meaningful citizenship—
citizenship that carried the same rights and privileges as it did in Paris—was granted to only a 
handful of évolués who had achieved educational, cultural or political standards.  Colonial 
French leaders at times expressed the hope that they could ultimately turn all the “subjects” of 
Overseas France into French “citizens.” 
“Superior races,” in the words of Jules Ferry, who served as Prime Minister in Paris 
during the 1880s, “have a right vis-￿-vis the inferior races…they have a right to civilize them.”
19 
The ideas of Ferry guided French colonial policy for decades.  In 1954 François Mitterand, then 
                                                 
 
18  Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and 
West Africa, 1895-1930 (Palo Alto, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 17. 
 
19  Quoted in Conklin, p. 13.  
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Minister of Overseas France, declared that “the work of Jules Ferry serves as an example and 
model of the most modern initiatives.”
20  For many French politicians, whether socialist or 
Gaullist, the goal of turning the ‘inferior races’ into “civilized” French citizens fell squarely in 
line with the republican ideology of 1789.  The constitutions of the Third and Fourth Republics 
each extended limited citizenship rights to “subjects” within the French empire. 
The French, of course, were not the only ones to use the “standard of civilization” as a 
justification for colonial conquest.  At the 1885 Berlin Conference, all European powers agreed 
to “bind themselves to watch over the preservation of the native tribes, and to care for the 
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material well-being,” with the ultimate aim of 
“instructing the natives and bringing home to them the blessings of civilization.”
21  This “sacred 
trust of civilization” was later incorporated into the League of Nations trusteeship system that 
entrusted the “tutelage” of those less “civilized” to “advanced” nations.  The “standard of 
civilization,” then, was not simply a legal instrument.  It also served as a sorting mechanism to 
justify the domination of non-European peoples by portraying colonial expansion as a 
humanitarian and civilizing mission. 
 
2.3  The “Standard of Civilization” as a Hegemonic Ideal 
  Finally, the “standard of civilization” served as a hegemonic ideal.  Codifying 
civilizational “standards” into international law and threading them through treaties signed with 
                                                 
 
20  Quoted in Frederick Quinn, The French Overseas Empire (Westport, Connecticut: 
Praeger, 2000), p. 114. 
 
21  Gong, p. 77.  
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non-European nations effectively invalidated the possibility of other “civilizations” or other 
“standards.”  European values, norms and institutions were deemed universally valid and used to 
gauge the progress of other nations.  Japan, for instance, entered the “civilized” world at the turn 
of the century after it revised its civil and criminal codes, signed an alliance with Great Britain 
and proved its military capacity by defeating the Russians in 1905.  The Ottomans, on the other 
hand, remained a “second class” power because their legal system differed from that of 
“civilized” Europe. 
  For colonial powers, conceptualizing European civilization as universal legitimated 
European expansion throughout the world.  It also meant that the non-European world would be 
judged by Europeans using a European set of criteria.  Those heading towards European values 
were inching closer to “civilization,” while those pursuing different paths were regarded as 
descending deeper into despotism and “savagery.”  For non-European powers, the “standard of 
civilization” became a principle of organization around which political systems and institutional 
structures were organized. 
 
3.  THE DECLINE OF THE “STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION” 
  The next question to ask is a simple one: what happened? If the “standard of civilization” 
was such an integral part of international law and international relations during the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when and why did it fade into obscurity?  Hedely Bull 
provides two answers.  “The disappearance in the present century of the distinction between full 
and partial membership in international society,” he writes, “i.e., of the distinction between those 
states which had met the standard of ‘civilization’, was indeed in part the result of a successful  
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revolt of Asian and African peoples against European dominance.  But it also reflected a 
continuing process which tended to lead to greater homogeneity of political communities.”
22  For 
Bull, anti-colonialism sunk the “civilization” project of colonial powers.  Interestingly, Bull does 
not suggest that the “standard of civilization” itself was problematic.  In fact, he goes to lengths 
to remind us that it was not.  “The arrogance of many Europeans,” he asserts, 
in equating civilization with the particular civilization of Europe, was no 
less than that of the Chinese, nor was the belief of Europeans that their 
religion was the one true faith any less than that of Muslim people with 
whom they came into contact.  The standard of “civilization” on which the 
Europeans insisted did indeed lead to unjust treatment, but the demand of 
Asian and African peoples for equality of rights in international law was 
one that the latter did not put forward until they had first absorbed ideas of 
the equal rights of states to sovereignty, or peoples to self-determination, 
and of persons of different race to individual rights, which before their 
contact with Europe played little or no part in their experience.
23 
 
What Bull is saying, essentially, is that the colonialism may have lead to “unjust treatment” but 
in the end, it had its benefits.  Asians and Africans, after all, “absorbed” the universal standards 
of equal rights, self-determination and individual rights.  Putting aside the sweeping claim that 
none of these norms existed in Africa or Asia prior to European contact, Bull suggests that the 
“standard” failed because colonized peoples revolted before “civilization” was fully “absorbed.” 
In this sense, the “standard” was simply overtaken by events. 
  Bull’s second explanation—increased homogeneity of political communities—is equally 
interesting for it also implies that the “standard” succeeded to a certain extent.  The “standard” 
was expressly designed, after all, to promote homogeneity.  Bull suggests that the distinction 
                                                 
 
22  Bull, p. ix. 
 
23  Ibid.  
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between “civilized” and “uncivilized” has lost its meaning because all modern states have met 
the necessary criteria. 
Gerrit Gong makes a slightly different argument.  He suggests that two forces, one within 
Europe and one without, precipitated the decline of the “standard of civilization.”  Like Bull, he 
locates the first force in colonial resistance.  “The standard,” he writes, “was increasingly 
considered anachronistic and insulting by the growing number of non-European countries which 
were becoming for both political and legal reasons full International Persons and members of the 
Family of Nations.”
24  The moment of de-colonization, Gong suggests, trigged a “bandwagon” 
atmosphere.  The number of African and Asian states to gain international recognition more than 
doubled from 1955 to 1961.  This left the “standard of civilization,” as a means of differentiating 
between states “ready” to join international society and those that were not, largely irrelevant.  
This is similar to Bull’s first explanation.  According to Gong, the “standard of civilization” 
collapsed not because of its internal inconsistencies but because its was overtaken by events.  
African and Asian states, in other words, jumped onto the “bandwagon” of independence, self-
determination and international recognition before demonstrating their ability to meet the 
European “standard of civilization.” 
The second force undercutting the “standard of civilization” came from within Europe 
itself and questioned the assumptions upon which the “standard” was based.  “The introduction 
of extraneous requirements such as the degree of civilization, the legitimacy of origin, the 
religious creed and the political system of a new community,” wrote one legal scholar in 1950, 
“would shift the basis of recognition from the objective test of State existence to nebulous, 
                                                 
 
24  Gong, p. 84.  
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intractable considerations.”
25  By the late 1930s, the “standard of civilization” was increasingly 
seen as ambiguous and arbitrary.  Countries that were civilized prima facie, such as Japan, could 
obviously never meet all the “standard of civilization” criteria.  The subjective and tacit 
assumptions about civilization made the ‘standard’ not only difficult to define but difficult to 
apply.
26  Furthermore, questions over the possibility of other standards or other civilizations 
challenged the idea of a single universally valid “standard” for all peoples and states. 
Most importantly, however, was the failure of Europe to live up to its own “standard of 
civilization.”  “Riddled as it was with overtones of discrimination against race, colour, and creed, 
the standard of ‘civilization’ withered as part of the corpus of beliefs that were rapidly becoming 
socially unfashionable.”
27  For Europeans and non-Europeans alike, fascism, Communism, two 
world wars, the holocaust and the brutalities of colonialism rendered Europe’s hegemonic claim 
over civilization increasingly untenable. 
This does not mean that the “standard of civilization” disappeared altogether.  Bull and 
Gong suggest that it may have been replaced with a new “standard of modernity” or a “standard 
of human rights.”  Another argument, however, could suggest that the “standard of civilization” 
has not been replaced but only re-configured. 
 
4.  FROM “STANDARD OF CIVILIZATION” TO ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE 
                                                 
 
25  Ti-chiang Chen, The International Law of Recognition, London (Stevens and Sons, 
under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs, 1951), p. 60 (also quoted in Gong, 
p. 86). 
 
26  Gong, p. 22. 
 
27  Gong, p. 87.  
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  This paper has outlined three uses of the “standard of civilization”: legal, discriminatory 
and hegemonic.  One could also add a fourth role: identity construction.  For some time, 
European nations have defined themselves in a similar manner.  They have used terms such as 
“advanced,” “developed” and “civilized.”  While there were clearly differences of identity within 
Europe, Europeans have seen the difference between the European “self” and the non-European 
“other” as much greater.  The largely peaceful division of Africa, culminating in the 1885 Berlin 
Conference, illustrates the extent to which colonial powers were able to join together under the 
common banner of “civilization.”  The “standard of civilization” moved the boundaries of the 
“self” and the “other” from the national level to the continental.  In this way, the “standard of 
civilization” provided a “European identity” long before anyone began to talk about the 
possibility of European integration.  It bridged the boundaries of language, culture, history and 
nationality to forge a new set of shared values, norms, culture and heritage. 
  In some ways, this “European identity” under the “standard of civilization” was much 
stronger than its contemporary EU counterpart, for it linked Europe’s discourses, treaties and 
policies.  Belgians, British, Dutch, French, Italians, Germans, Portuguese and Spanish were all 
united by the “standard of civilization” and the need to extend it to the Asian and African 
“other.”  “Identities are forged,” writes Anthony Smith in The Question of Europe, “out of 
shared experiences, memories and myths, in relation to those of other collective identities.  They 
are in fact often forged through opposition to the identities of significant others, as the history of 
paired conflict so often demonstrates.  Who or what, then are Europe’s significant others?”
28  
                                                 
 
28 Anthony D. Smith, “National Identity and European Unity,” in Peter Gowan and Perry 
Anderson, eds., The Question of Europe (London: Verso, 1997), p. 339.  
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Smith suggests that the Cold War provided one set of significant others.  If he were to cast his 
net back a few more decades, however, he would realize what this paper has already pointed 
out—until the collapse of the “standard of civilization,” the “barbarian,” and not the 
“communist,” was Europe’s significant other. 
Smith does recognize the possibility of a non-European “other,” but he sees this as a 
potential future development rather than a historical artifact.  “There is the prospect,” he writes, 
of an increasingly affluent, stable, conservative but democratic European 
federation, facing, and protecting itself from, the demands and needs of 
groups of states in Africa, Asia and Latin America.  To some extent this 
prospect is still mitigated by the remaining ex-colonial ties between 
certain European and certain African or Asian states.  But were the 
European project to achieve its political goals, it would entail not just 
economic exclusion but also cultural differentiation and with it the 
possibility of cultural and racial exclusion.  The forging of a deep 
continental cultural identity to support political unification may well 
require an ideology of European cultural exclusiveness.
29 
 
Smith seems to have forgotten historical developments prior to the postwar project of European 
integration.  This may be a function of the larger problem surrounding studies of the acquis 
communautaire—i.e., the tendency to limit research to the time-line of European unification, 
thereby missing many of the structural and institutional legacies that shaped the Union’s 
formation.  Smith is clearly speaking of a hypothetical future situation, yet the “standard of 
civilization” provided a “European identity” based on exactly the kind of exclusion Smith 
describes. 
  The implosion of the “standard of civilization” by the mid twentieth century forced 
Europe to reassess its conception not only of the “other” but also of the “self.”  Abroad, African 
                                                 
 
29  Ibid., pp. 339-40.  
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and Asian nations achieved independence and joined the “family of nations” without reference to 
the suddenly “antiquated standard of civilization.”  Post-colonial nations aptly used the 
references to self-determination in the UN and Atlantic Charters as well as the example of World 
War II which was promoted by the Allied powers—who used tens of thousands of Asian and 
African conscripts—as a fight for “liberation.” 
  With regard to the “other,” French colonial discourse employed the concept “acquis 
colonial” long before the start of the postwar project of European integration to rank the relative 
position and “progress” of its colonial possessions.
 28  When an “other,” in this case Asia and 
Africa, succeeds in redefining itself, the identity of the “self,” or Europe, must also change.  
Hedley Bull and Gerrit Gong argue that the “standard of civilization” became irrelevant in the 
face of de-colonization.  They also suggest that the “standard” was largely met—all states now 
belong to the “Family of Nations” and the dichotomy between “civilized” and “uncivilized” no 
longer applies.  This paper offers a different explanation.  It suggests that the Europe abandoned 
the “standard of civilization” at mid twentieth century because it had become plain to all that 
European claims to hegemony over civilization were bankrupt.  European powers went back to 
the drawing board, so to speak.  They initially focused internally to find a new sense of 
“civilization” at home as a means to reconstruct a new European “self.”  This meant replacing 
the subjective, primordial elements of the “standard of civilization” with a clearly codified set of 
criteria delineating what it means to be European. 
                                                 
 
28  For example, http://www.guinee.net/bibliotheque/histoire/st25aout.html; and 
http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/francophonie/memoire/gdesdates.html.  
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  This is the context surrounding the acquis communautaire.  It is no coincidence that the 
acquis stress many of the same components that formed the cornerstones of the “standard of 
civilization.”  Adherence to the responsibilities and obligations of treaties, reciprocation, 
harmonized legal and institutional structures, and zero-sum membership (one is either in or out) 
are key elements of both the “standard of civilization” and the acquis communautaire. Here the 
parallels between the cases of the Ottoman Empire and present day Turkey are revealing.  
Elements of the “civilization” project worked their way into European unification—this is not 
surprising since many of the same politicians were influential actors in both systems.  The 
Schuman Declaration of 1950 and the Preamble to the ECSC Treaty, for instance, declare that 
“la contribution qu’une Europe organisée et vivante peut apporter ￿ la civilisation est 
indispensable au maintain des relations pacifiques.”
30 
Furthermore, the acquis plays the same roles as the “standard of civilization.”  It serves 
as a legal doctrine, a sorting mechanism, a hegemonic ideal.  It also has become the basis for 
developing a common European identity.  The core difference is the extent to which the 
“standard” and the acquis produce a sense of common identity among Europeans.  The 
“standard” forged a European identity largely because it had a clearly defined other.  The acquis, 
on the other hand, is far more concerned with the interior architecture of Europe than with other 
regions of the world.  This does not mean, however, that the acquis is incapable of producing an 
other along the same lines as the “standard of civilization.”  Indeed, the tendency of EU officials 
to use the acquis as a proxy for European values and a measurement of the progress of non-EU 
states strikes a chord the world has heard before. 
                                                 
 
30   From the text of The Robert Schuman declaration, 6 May 1950.  
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5.  THE ACQUIS COMMUNAUTAIRE IN PRACTICE 
  The transition from the “standard of civilization” to the acquis was not immediate.  
During the early years of European integration, some public figures continued to invoke 
primordial arguments emphasizing race and religion.
31  Although even today one need not look 
far to find racial or primordial rhetoric used in discussions on European integration, this 
approach is now thoroughly delegitimated in public discourse.
32  Most contemporary appeals to 
European “values” and European “civilization” make a different argument.  The legal and 
political standards embodied by the acquis have largely replaced the older, more visceral 
formulation.  Still, one of the problems that plague analyses of the acquis communautaire is the 
slippery nature of the term itself.  Although the acquis now covers more than 80,000 pages of 
documentation, it is, in the words of Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace, like “something that 
everybody has heard about…but nobody knows what it looks like.”
33 
                                                 
 
31  Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1970), p. 171. 
 
32  For example, in November 2002, former French president and head of the European 
Union’s constitutional convention, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, said in an interview with le Monde 
that Turkey's Muslim population and high birthrate amounted to “a different culture, a different 
approach, a different way of life.”  Giscard added, “Its capital is not in Europe, 95 percent of its 
population lives outside Europe, it is not a European country.”  Giscard asserted that if Turkey 
were allowed into the European Union, other nations in the Middle East and North Africa would 
clamor to join.  He concluded, “In my opinion, it would be the end of the European Union.” (Le 
Monde, 8 November 2002). 
  It is worth noting that Giscard was roundly attacked for these remarks and was forced to 
retract them. 
 
33  Anna Michalski, Anna and Helen Wallace, The European Community: The 
Challenges of Enlargement, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), p. 35.  
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  Before the 1991 Treaty on European Union (TEU, a.k.a. the Maastricht Treaty) endowed 
the acquis communautaire with a constitutional status, “acquis had been used in at least four 
different contexts: the enlargement of the Community (the ‘accession’ acquis), the development 
of the European construct (the ‘institutional’ acquis), association with third countries (the 
‘Lomé’ acquis), and the Agreement on the European Economic Area (the ‘EEA’ acquis).”
34  As 
Schmitter suggests, the oldest and most well known acquis is associated with accession.  This is 
“the whole body of rules, political principles and judicial decisions which new Member States 
must adhere to, in their entirety and from the beginning, when the become members.”
35  This 
usage of the concept and term acquis to assess the worthiness of potential new members echoes 
the clinical gaze the French applied to their colonies to delineate the aquis colonial. 
At first glance, one might argue the codification of “Europeanness” embodied in the 
acquis communautaire represents an improvement over the older conceptualization because it 
has replaced a subjective and ambiguous definition of “Europe” with an precise, seemingly 
objective standard of measurement.  For example, the acquis enables the EU’s High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to claim that 80 percent 
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries “share European values” simply because 
that was the percentage of nations from those regions that signed of the 1995 revised Lomé 
convention.
36 
                                                 
 
34  Gialdino, p. 1090. 
 
35  Schmitter, p. 162. 
 
36  Statement by Javier Solana in “Positive Comments From Both Parties After Signing of 
Revised Lomé Convention,” Europe Daily Bulletins, No. 6601-09/11/1995.  
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With each round of enlargement, the accession have acquis became longer and more 
elaborate.  The second and third rounds of enlargement provided perhaps the strongest impulses 
toward expanding and formalizing the acquis, because the candidates pool consisted of the then 
emerging democracies of Greece, Portugal and Spain.  The EU has currently organized the 
acquis communautaire into 31 chapters for the express purpose of facilitating accession 
negotiations with several nations in central and eastern Europe.  During an enlargement round, 
these chapters become “the focus of intensive screening and negotiations between the EU and 
each of the candidate countries.”
37  The term “negotiation,” however, 
is a bit of a misnomer…since a basic requirement of EU 
membership is that candidate countries accept and apply all of the acquis, 
as it stands at the point of accession.  Only certain “transitional 
arrangements” are permitted, but these must be limited in number and 
scope, of a limited duration, and accompanied by detailed plans with firm 
deadlines for fully implementing the acquis.  Thus, not much real 
bargaining occurs in the accession negotiations: the final outcome is pre-
determined—full and complete acceptance of the acquis—and whatever 
bargaining there is focuses on these limited transitional arrangements.
38 
  
  Based on the above descriptions, it is possible to abstract the following principles.  
First, the acquis cannot be separated from the treaties and agreements that bind member states.  
Full and complete acceptance of the acquis means full and complete acceptance of EU treaties 
and protocols.  This ensures reciprocity between member states.  It also ensures that member 
states will fulfill the responsibilities and obligations associated with all EU agreements.  In 
return for meeting the performance requirements of the acquis, member states (and their citizens) 
                                                 
 
37  Michael J. Baun, “EU Enlargement and the Acquis Communautaire:  The 
Consequences for Transatlantic Relations,” AICGS/DAAD Working Paper Series, Washington, 
DC, 2002, p. 1. 
 
38  Ibid.  
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are granted the rights and privileges associated with EU membership.  Second, to prevent 
members from “shopping around,” the acquis comprise a set of institutional ‘givens’ that must 
be accepted as a whole.  Those who accept the acquis retain the possibility of becoming EU 
members.  Those who cannot meet the requirements of the acquis will remain outside the 
European community. Finally, it is possible to identify a broader function of the acquis.  
Obviously, the acquis are used to differentiate prospective members who have the capacity and 
the willingness to honor EU treaties and protocols from those who do not.  Yet, the codification 
of the acquis does more than this.  It standardizes European ‘values’ in such a way that they can 
then be used as a meter-stick to take the measure of other, non-EU states. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
  This paper demonstrates that the genealogy of the acquis communautaire begins with the 
“standard of civilization” doctrine of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Like the 
“standard of civilization,” the acquis communautaire as currently constituted and employed 
privileges the European Union as the exclusive font of the values and practices of “civilization,” 
and invests the EU as the judge determining which nations belong to the club of the civilized.  
This formulation of European identity, with its inherently exclusionary framework, unavoidably 
divides the world into the admitted, the potentially admittable and an inferior non-admittable, 
non-EU “other.”  These categories are all too reminiscent of the civilized, the semi-civilized and 
the barbarian found in the standards of civilization.  Policy-makers and scholars should therefore 
take great care with the emerging notion of European identity and values, given this questionable  
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pedigree and inherent divisiveness.  Non-judicious employment of it risks the reemergence of 
European chauvinism. 
 